ATTACHMENT A

- 1. The most accurate intelligence obtainable on the Soviet ability and readiness to launch an attack against the United States can provide a basis for fixing the speed and effort of our preparations to counter. It can, in particular situations, provide background against which to judge Soviet intentions.
- 2. We know that the Russians are scientifically and technically competent but we do not know how far this competence has been able to take them along the road of building a threat to our security. Some questions which face the intelligence community are: Are they still in the "catching up" stage? Are they keeping abreast of us, or have they broken away and gone ahead (possibly on a course we are unable to predict from the information we have from other sources)? We have seen the Russians indulge in bluffs before. They have spoken glibly in terms of accomplishment and production in particular fields when in fact they were only at the research stage or, at best, were tackling development problems. Knowing when the Russians are bluffing and when they are speaking from strength are other questions which must be answered.
- 3. For the most part the accuracy of our intelligence on Soviet ability and readiness to launch an attack against us -- the accuracy with which we can answer the corollary questions -- involves three matters:
 - a. Guided Missiles.
 - b. Long Range Bombers.
 - c. Nuclear Weapons Production.